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NOTES
-court is satisfied that his discharge or release will be "without
danger to others or to himself. '3 2 If the court is not so satisfied
it may. hold a contradictory hearing on the matter.3 3 This pro-
posed legislation seems at least to furnish the committed person
:a better opportunity for discharge or release on probation, by
-allowing adequate cognizance to be taken of medical opinion.
However, the suggested standard, "danger to others or to him-
self," may easily be open to the same criticism voiced against
"menace to society," if it is construed to mean a mere potential
-danger. Whether this proposed legislation would be construed
as a criminal rather than a civil matter remains to be seen. 4
It is submitted that additional legislation might be advisable
to insure appellate review. In any event, it is hoped that if the
result of the instant case is followed, the Supreme Court's super-
visory powers will be construed more liberally to insure that
such a committed person is afforded a fair opportunity to be
heard and is not incarcerated for life because of a mere pos-
sibility that he will be a menace to society.
Paul H. Dug_
FEDERAL COURTS - CHANGE OF VENUE UNDER SECTION 1404 (a)
- CONSIDERATION OF APPLICABLE SUBSTANTIVE LAW.
"IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE"
Section 1404 (a) of the Judicial Code' authorizes a federal
district court to transfer a civil action to any other district
where it might have been brought 2 upon the showing that the
32. Id. art. 17.
33. Ibid.
34. Note that article 17 of the proposed revision on Insanity Proceedings,
although based on section 4.08(3) of the ALI Model Penal Code, deleted the
provision that "any such hearing shall be deemed a civil proceding." See note 29
supra.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1958): "For the convenience of parties and wit-
nesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action
to any other district or division where it might have been brought." See generally
Kaufman, Observations on Transfers under Section 1404(a) of the New Judicial
Code, 10 F.R.D. 595 (1950).
2. The Court in Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960) construed the
words "where it might have been brought" to mean that the plaintiff must have
had an unqualified right to bring the action in the proposed transferee court in-
dependent of the consent of the defendant. See generally 1 MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE 0.145[6] (2d ed. 1964). The Court seems to have retreated somewhat
from this position. See Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964) noted 42
TzxAs L. REv. 1085, 1086 (1964).
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transfer is desirable 'under the relevant criteria of convenience
and fairness. 3 The transfer for convenience in a diversity of
.citizenship case will often raise two interrelated issues of ap-
plicable state law as between the transferor and transferee dis-
'trict courts under the Erie doctrine. 4 First, must the direction
that federal district courts hearing diversity cases apply the law
-of the states "in which they sit"5 be interpreted literally by the
'transferee court after a change of venue under section 1404 (a) ?
Second, must the federal district court, upon a motion to trans-
fer, consider as among the factors "in the interest of justice,"
the effect of the requirement that the transferee court apply the
'law which would have been applied in the transferor court?
Section 1404(a), adopted in 1948, was based upon a modi-
fied doctrine of forum non conveniens,6 a concept by which a
court can dismiss a suit, although it has personal and subject
matter jurisdiction, if the convenience of another forum greatly
outweighs that of the plaintiff's chosen venue.7 As a transfer
under section 1404(a) means only a change of venue and the
continuation of the instituted suit, the trial judge has a broader
discretion to transfer than he has to dismiss under the doctrine
or forum non conveniens ;8 the latter disposition would necessitate
the institution of a new suit in the more convenient forum.
The section requires consideration of the following standards:
3. See Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616 (1964).
4. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
5. See Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941). An administrator sued a
life insurance company in the district court in Texas to collect under a policy.
The company responded with a bill of interpleader, bringing in all other claimants
under the policy, some of whom were assignees residing in New York. The New
York claimants were successful in the lower court which applied the law of New
York, the place where the contract was consummated. The Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that the Texas rule of insurable interest which precluded recovery
by the assignees would apply, on the ground that a Texas state court would
have applied that rule to the foreign contract. "The federal courts in diversity
of citizenship cases are governed by the conflict of laws rules of the courts of the
state in which they sit." Id. at 503.
6. The Reviser's notes state that § 1404(a) was drafted "in accordance with
the doctrine of a forum non conveniens." See Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 58
(1949).' Recognizing that this stated the intention of Congress too narrowly, the
Court in Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 32 (1954), stated: "When Con-
gress adopted § 1404(a), it intended to do more than just codify the existing
'law on forum non conveniens. . . . Congress, in writing § 1404(a), which was
an entirely new section, was revising as well as codifying."
7. See Koster v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947) ; Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947) ; 1 BARRON & HOLY/OFF, FEDERAL PRAcTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 87 (Wright ed. 1960).
8. Norwood v. Kirkpatrick; 349 U.S. 29 (1955). In a recent per curiain
.opinion in Parsons v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 375 U.S. 71, 72 (1963), the Court
•held-that a § 1404(a) motion and a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens
require "evaluations of similar, but by no means identical, objective criteria."
1965] NOTES
the convenience of the parties,9 the convenience of witnesses,10
and the interest of justice." There is often substantial :overlap
among these criteria and each has occasioned litigation, but the
most carefully scrutinized standard has been that of ,the "inter-
est of justice." Courts have decided that this standard may be
tested by reference to: access to proof ;12 the possibility of a
jury view of the premises ;13 the distance over which the: transfer
is to be made ;14 the congestion of court dockets ;15 the facility
with which a judgment may be enforced ;16 and the avoidance
of multiplicity of litigation through consolidation. 7
The United States Supreme Court recently considered the
criteria for transfer of a civil action in Van Dusen v. Barrack,8
and added to the list of considerations "in the interest of justice"
a determination of the effect of the requirement that the trans-
feree court apply the law of the state of the transferor court.'9
In Van Dusen an action was commenced in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania seeking
damages for wrongful death as the result of the crash of a
commercial airliner into Boston Harbor. More than 150 actions
9. The convenience of the parties may include: the residences of the parties,
1 BARRON & HOLTZoFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 86.4 (Wright ed.
1960) ; the availability and convenience of counsel, ibid.; and the cost of addi-
tional counsel if the action is transferred, Hokanson v. Helene Curtis Indus.,
177 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
10. The convenience of witnesses may include: the availability of compulsory
process and the cost of obtaining attendance, Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R. v. Hugh
Breeding, Inc., 247 F.2d 217 (10th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 880; the
possibility of obtaining live testimony, Polaroid Corp. v. Casselman, 213 F. Supp.
379 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) ; and the location of pertinent records of documents, Ruskey
v. Reed, 225 F. Supp. 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
11. See generally 1 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 86.6 (Wright ed. 1960).
12. See 1 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.145[5] at 1780 (2d ed. 1964).
13. See United Air Lines, Inc. v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 796 (D. Del.
1961).
14. See discussion in ibid. See also Deutsch v. Dunne, 197 F. Supp. 907
(E.D.N.Y. 1961).
15. See, e.g., Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R. v. Igoe, 220 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1955),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 822.
16. See 1 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.145[5] at 1781 (2d ed. 1964).
17. See Continental Grain Co. v. The FBL - 585, 364 U.S. 19 (1960) ; cf.
'United Air Lines, Inc. v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 796 (D. Del. 1961).
18. 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
19. Id. at 644. The Court affirmed the doctrine first announced by the Tenth
Circuit in Headrick v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 182 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1950),
that when the defendant seeks transfer, the transferee district court is obligated
to apply the state law that would have been applied had there been no change of
venue, i.e., the law of the state of the transferor district court. When the law
to be applied is unsettled, involves policy considerations peculiar to the state, or
involves a complex conflict of laws rule, the difficulty of application in' the trans-
'feree. court is apparent. See generally 1 'BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 86.6 (Wright ed. 1960).
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for personal injury and wrongful death had been instituted
against the airline and others, some 45 of these actions being
filed in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Upon defendant's
motion under section 1404 (a) for transfer to the District of
Massachusetts where some actions were pending, the trial court
granted the request, holding that the transfer was justified re-
gardless of whether the transferred actions would be governed
by the law of Pennsylvania or of Massachusetts."0 On certiorari
to the United States Supreme Court, it was held that when the
defendants seek transfer, the transferee district court is obli-
,gated to apply the state law that would have been applied if
there had been no change of venue -that a change of venue
under section 1404 (a) generally should be, with respect to state
law, but a change of courtrooms. 21 The Court added that in
considering the motion for change of venue under the relevant
criteria of convenience and fairness, the district court must
include a determination of the uncertainty which may exist in
the law" and policy of the state of the transferor court and the
relative difficulty which may be encountered in applying that
law and policy in the transferee court.22 Thus the district court
sitting in Pennsylvania was directed to consider not only what
law a Pennsylvania state court would find applicable if hearing
the cause, but also the clarity of the law and other problems the
Massachusetts district court would have in applying the proper
law.
The recent decision in Pearson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,2
20. Popkin v. Eastern Airlines, 204 F. Supp. 426 (E.D. Pa. 1962). Plaintiff
sought mandamus in the court of appeals to vacate the transfer order. In-Barrack
v. Van Dusen, 309 F.2d 953 (3d Cir. 1962), the court of appeals reversed, holding
that a transfer could be granted only if the plaintiff had an unqualified right to
bring suit in the transferee district. Relying upon the construction of the words
"where it might have been brought" as set forth in Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S.
335 (1960), the court found that the transfer was improper as the plaintiff
[administrator] was qualified only under Pennsylvania law and not under Massa-
chusetts law. In Van Dusen v. Barrack. 376 U.S. 612, 627 (1964), the Supreme
Court reversed, distinguishing Hoffman on the ground that there the defendants
were seeking a transfer to a forum where statutory venue did not exist. The
Court held that upon transfer, the federal district court sitting in Massachusetts
would merely be hearing a Pennsylvania action as if it were a federal district
court sitting in Pennsylvania. See Note, 42 TEXAS L. REV. 1085 (1964).
21. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 636 (1964).
22. Id. at 644.
23. 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 912 (1963). The
court relied heavily upon the recent decision of the New York Court of Appeals
in Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d
133 (1963). For an incisive discussion of these cases as regards conflicts of law,
see Symposium, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Deevlopment in
Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1212 (1963).
[Vol.! XXV
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is illustrative of the difficult problem which a motion to transfer
may pose for a district court after Van Dusen. In a factual
setting much like Van Dusen, plaintiff, a New York domiciliary,
brought an action for the wrongful death of her husband, also
a New York domiciliary, against a Massachusetts corporation.
Venue was laid in a federal district court in New York, plain-
tiff asserting a cause of action under the Massachusetts wrong-
ful death statute, which measures damages by the culpability
of the defendant, the maximum amount recoverable being
$15,000.24 The plaintiff was permitted recovery under the
Massachusetts law, but the court refused to limit judgment to
$15,000, holding that the statute required application of a
standard of culpability, contrary to New York law which ap-
plied a standard of pecuniary loss with no maximum limitation,
and thus the Massachusetts standard was unenforceable against
a New York resident.2 5 Faced with such an expression of the
law and policy of the state of the transferor court, the dilemma
24. MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 229, § 2 (1949 and Supp. 1961). The statute has
been amended to raise the upper limit on recovery to $20,000.
25. See Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526,
211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1963). See also Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191
N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963) ; Symposium, Comments on Babcock v.
Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 CoLUM. L. Rzv. 1212
(1963).
In Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964), there was avoided any specu-
lation whether Pennsylvania would impose its damage policy upon the Massa-
chusetts death statute. This issue has been resolved by the Pennsylvania courts
in Griffith v. United Airlines, Inc., 203 A.2d 796 (Pa. 1964), where on facts
similar to Van Dusen, Pearson, and Kilberg, it was held that Pennsylvania could
impose its death policy upon the Colorado death statute, where Pennsylvania
had the "most significant relationship with the occurrence and the parties." Id.
at 802.
Situations which justify refusal of a state to apply a law of another state
which the forum state finds in violation of its public policy probably have their
limitations. The rationale seems to be that the interest of the state must be very
great to justify the imposition of a different damage policy upon the death statute
of the state in which the action arose. See, e.g., Skahill v. Capital Airlines, Inc.,
234 F. Supp. (S.D.N.Y. 1964), where a plaintiff who was a citizen of Rhode
Island sued the defendant on a cause of action arising out of an accident in
Virginia, the suit being filed in a federal court in New York. Defendant moved
to limit recovery to the $30,000 maximum allowable under the Virginia statute.
Plaintiff relied on Kilberg and Pearson, contending that such a limitation is
against the public policy of New York. In holding for the defendant, the court
emphasized that the plaintiff was not a resident of New York, and that the
contracts in the state or the interests of the state must be great to justify the
imposition of the New York damage policy on the Virginia statute. Accord,
Gore v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 222 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (plaintiff had
been a resident of New York, but had moved to Maryland since the action arose;
held, the State of New York did not have a sufficient interest in the action tojustify a superimposition of its damage policy upon the Massachusetts death
statute, as had been done in Kilberg and Pearson) ; Thompson v. Capital Airlines,
Inc., 220 F. Supp. 140, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) ("the public policy considerations
which motivated Kilberg [will not] be extended to non-residents").
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in which a transferee court sitting in Massachusetts would find
itself is apparent. Van Dusen directs the transferor court to
consider this dilemma upon the motion to transfer, "in the inter-
est of justice." Thus if the transferor court finds that the law
and policy which, under Erie, it would be bound to apply would
be "difficult or unclear and might not defer" to the laws of the
state of the transferee court, it should weigh that factor heavily
against granting of the motion to transfer. Moreover, since the
laws and policy of the state of the transferor court would gov-
ern the transferred action, the feasibility of consolidation with
suits pending in the transferee court may be substantially cur-
tailed. 27 Consideration of the law to be applied is not without
precedent, for "it has long been recognized that: 'There is an
appropriateness * * * in having the trial of a diversity case in
a forum that is at home with the state law that must govern
the case, rather than having a court in some other forum un-
tangle problems in conflict of laws, and in law foreign to itself.'
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert. ' '28
It is interesting to speculate whether, after Van Dusen, a
federal doctrine of forum non conveniens yet lives. 29 Presented
with an action commenced in an extremely inconvenient forum,
a court may nevertheless be reluctant to transfer because of
uncertainty of the law to be applied or difficulty in its applica-
tion. For example, should the transfer place the transferee
court in the uncomfortable position of having to superimpose
the damage policy of the state of the transferor court upon the
law of the state in which it sits, the court where the action was
commenced may be tempted to dismiss the action, thus forcing
it to be brought again in the place where it may be most expedi-
26. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 626 (1964). See 1 BA aoN &
HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 86.6 (Wright ed. 1960).
27. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 644 (1964).
28. Id. at 645.
29. An extensive discussion of the doctrine as applied in federal courts may
be found in Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60 HARV. L. REv. 908
(1947) ; cf. Rodrigues v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 311 F.2d 429 (5th Cir.
1962).
A collateral but nonetheless intriguing question is raised concerning the pos-
sible application of a state's doctrine of forum non conveniens in the federal
court under Erie R.R. v. Tompkins. Must the federal court dismiss where the
state court would have done so, or may it transfer under § 1404(a)? The Su-
preme Court in Van Dusen expressly avoided answering this question. 376 U.S.
612, 640 (1964). Compare Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws,
22 U. Cmi. L. Ray. 405 (1955) ; with Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflict
of Laws: A Retraction, 27 U. Cm. L. REV. 341 (1960). For a general discussion
of the doctrine of forum non conveniens in state courts, see Barrett, The Doctrine
of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 CALIF. L. Ray. 380 (1947).
[Vol. XXV
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tiously tried. 0 This result would seem to put a penalty upon
the plaintiff's choice of the extremely inconvenient forum, a
result section 1404 (a) was designed to prevent. Moreover, it
may be argued that a revival of the rule of Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Gilbert,-" even in the extreme case suggested, is an unwarranted
judicial narrowing of the rules of venue, so liberally circum-
scribed by Congress in section 1404(a).32
An alternative solution which found favor after the intro-
duction of section 1404 (a) but before the law-to-be-applied prob-
lem had been settled by Van Dusen, may facilitate the transfer
to the convenient forum, yet at the same time minimize the
problems raised by the requirement which obligates the trans-
feree court to apply the law of the state of the transferor court.
A transfer may be conditioned upon a stipulation of the moving
party that he will not assert the local statute which may be.
detrimental to the cause of the adverse party.33 Further, the
transferor court could preliminarily decide what law would be
applied in the transferor court and so indicate in the order
granting transfer to the moving party.34 Thus the transferee
30. In the following cases the court found dismissal proper rather than trans-
fer: LeClair v. Shell Oil Co., 183 F. Supp. 255 (S.D. Ill. 1960) (federal question
jurisdiction; motion to transfer to Delaware denied and action dismissed; most
convenient forum was Pennsylvania, a state to which transfer was not possible) ;
McGee v. Southern Pac. Co., 151 F. Supp. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (diversity ac-
tion on cause arising in California where California statute of limitations had
run; motion to transfer to New Jersey denied and action dismissed) ; Hammett
v. Warner Bros., Inc., 176 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1949) (transfer denied and action
dismissed where issue could be more conveniently tried in another suit pending
in another court between different parties).
31. 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
32. See generally 1 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§71 (Wright ed. 1960).
33. Transfer was conditionally granted in the following cases: Humble Oil &
Ref. Co. v. The Patsy H, 198 F. Supp. 423 (D. Del. 1961) (stipulation that
moving party would not rely on statute of limitations of state of transferee court
to found a plea of laches) ; Hokanson v. Helene Curtis Indus., Inc., 177 F. Supp.
701 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (stipulations that defendant would not rely on statute of
limitations of state of transferee court, and defendant would reimburse plaintiff
for additional attorney's fees) ; May v. The Steel Navigator, 152 F. Supp. 254
(S.D.N.Y. 1957) (stipulation of waiver of statute of limitations as foundation
of a plea of Inches) ; Crawford v. The S.S. Shirley Lykes, 148 F. Supp. 958
(S.D.N.Y. 1957) (same); Curry v. States Marine Corp., 118 F. Supp. 234
(S.D.N.Y. 1954) (same) ; Frechoux v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 118 F. Supp. 234
(S.D.N.Y. 1953 (same)
34. See Jozwiak v. Dayton Oil Co., 200 F. Supp. 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (the
court determined the effect of the applicable law for the benefit of the transferee
court, in the event of transfer, although it subsequently denied the motion to
transfer) ; Hokanson v. Helene Curtis Indus., 177 F. Supp. 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) ;
Curry v. States Marine Corp., 118 F. Supp. 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) ; cf. Chenoweth
v. Atchison, T. & S.F. R.R., 229 F. Supp. 540 (D. Colo. 1964) (re-transfer to
Kansas for the original transferor court to determine the law to be applied to
the parties).
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court will have notice of the law which would be applied in the
transferor court on an important issue, thereby minimizing the
difficulties inherent in the former's determination and applica-
tion of the law and policy of the state of the transferor court.35
This discussion of considerations involved in a transfer under
section 1404 (a) is particularly important in Louisiana because
of its civil law tradition. It is not difficult to suppose a case
in which interpretation or construction of civilian institutions
would be crucial to parties litigating here. There is little likeli-
hood that judges sitting in federal courts in common law juris-
dictions will have the same expertise as a Louisiana judge in
civil law generally, or Louisiana civil law in particular. This is a
factor that may militate against transfer to a district court
sitting in a common law jurisdiction. If transfer is ultimately
granted, it may be advisable for the federal district court sitting
in Louisiana to insure the clarity of the applicable law by either
a transfer conditioned upon stipulation of the parties, or a pro-
nouncement on the applicable law of Louisiana.
Richard B. Wilkins, Jr.
LEASES - SALE OF LEASE DISTINGUISHED FROM SALE OF
RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY
Plaintiff and defendant entered a lease agreement contain-
ing an acceleration clause. Upon nonpayment of rent by defend-
ant, plaintiff obtained judgment for rent past due and rent for
the unexpired term of the lease. The judgment recognized plain-
tiff lessor's privilege on defendant's movables situated on the
leased premises. National Cash Register intervened, asserting
a vendor's privilege and chattel mortgage on several cash reg-
isters which had been placed on the leased premises prior to
recordation of the chattel mortgage. By virtue of a writ of fieri
facias, both the right of occupancy and defendant's movables,
35. The feasibility of such a pronouncement will depend upon the stage of
the proceedings in the transferor court. If the proceeding is in the preliminary
pleading stage, it may be difficult or impossible for the court to isolate issues
of law which may be determinative of the case. This dilemma would appear to
be a factor which militates against transfer. See Chenoweth v. Atchison, T. & S.F.
R.R., 229 F. Supp. 540 (D. Colo. 1964), where the transferee court transferred
the action back to the transferor court, as the original transfer was premature
in view of the complex issues of law which could most expeditiously be isolated
and decided 'by the transferor court at a later stage in proceedings there.
[Vol. XXV
